Operation Condor: A transnational criminal conspiracy, uncovered


ARCHIVO – En esta foto de archivo del 24 de Marzo de 1976, el dictador argentino General Rafael Videla, en el centro, toma posesión como presidente en Buenos Aires. (AP Photo/Eduardo Di Baia, Archivo)

On May 27, for the first time ever, a court in Latin America
ruled that Operation Condor was a supranational criminal conspiracy organized
to disappear political opponents across borders. The verdict was handed down by
an Argentine court that convicted 14 high- and mid-ranking Argentine military
officers who acted during the 1976-1983 dictatorship, and one Uruguayan
military officer, for their involvement in this criminal plan.

This investigation into the Condor crimes began in Argentina
in 1999 when two lawyers, David Baigún and Alberto Pedroncini, filed a legal
complaint on behalf of five disappeared persons of different nationalities, all
of them victims of the Southern Cone dictatorships' repressive coordination during
the 1970s. The main argument was that these disappearances were carried out in
the framework of a conspiracy between the highest-ranking military and
political leaders, making criminal use of the state apparatus, in a context of
dictatorial regimes in our region.

The judicial investigation lasted 14 years, during which
time the case expanded. The Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) joined
the case in 2004 in representation of family members of some of those who had
been disappeared. The public trial finally began in March 2013. At the time of
the ruling, 105 cases of disappeared persons formed part of this judicial
process: Uruguayans, Chileans, Paraguayans, Bolivians and several Argentines
kidnapped in Brazil made it possible to draw up an unprecedented map of
Operation Condor.

The puzzle

The ruling mobilized hundreds of witnesses, some of whom were
survivors of concentration camps, relatives of the disappeared, researchers,
journalists and public officials. Their stories referred to a common thread of
struggle, persecution, exile and death. Many testified via videoconference from
their countries of origin.

In addition to these testimonies, there were thousands of
documents and archival materials that made it possible to explain the scope of
the operation: a dozen reports by human rights organizations; more than 400
dossiers from the National Committee on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP)
in Argentina; various reports from international organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees; thousands of declassified documents from the US
State Department, Paraguay's Archive of Terror, the National Security Archive,
the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the National
Archive of Memory in Argentina and the Historical Research on the Detained-Disappeared
conducted by the Presidency of Uruguay;  partial reports from the Rio de Janeiro State Truth Commission
in Brazil; hundreds of documents from the armed forces; and journalistic,
historical and judicial investigations.

One of the texts of huge evidentiary significance was the
founding document of Operation Condor, discovered in 1992 in Paraguay and
incorporated into this trial. Signed in Santiago, Chile, in November 1975 by
representatives of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia, it outlined
the terms of the criminal plan. Later, when the US State Department declassified
documents related to that era in 2002, Brazil’s participation was verified.

The trial, then, provided the ideal scenario for
contributing more knowledge about Operation Condor and it enabled witness’s voices
to overlap with the documents.

A criminal structure

The founding
document of Operation Condor structured the lawsuit that led to
the trial. Bilateral and multilateral contacts for exchanging information were
established at that first inter-American meeting of National Intelligence in
1975. The country representatives agreed to form a coordinating office to
provide background on people or organizations connected with so-called “subversive”
activity. Within this bureaucracy of terror, there was a recommendation that quick
contact be made to alert intelligence agencies when an individual was to be expelled
from a country or when a "suspect" was found to be traveling. They
also agreed to allow the presence of intelligence personnel at the embassies of
their countries.

The repressive coordination was planned in three phases. The
first involved the creation of a centralized database of information about
guerrilla movements, leftist political parties and groups, trade unionists, clergy
and liberal politicians – in other words, everyone who the authoritarian
governments identified as enemies.

The second phase consisted of taking action. Once the targets
were identified, the attacks occurred.

The third and final phase, which was the most problematic,
implied operations outside the region to find and eliminate dissidents who were
in other countries in the Americas and Europe.

The ideological foundation for Operation Condor − a name
used by the Uruguayan delegation to pay tribute to the host nation, Chile − was
the National Security Doctrine.

The role of the United States

The United States government knew of the coordinated
repression from early on, something that was also proven at the trial.

On September 28, 1976, special FBI agent Robert Scherrer
sent a cable from his country’s embassy in Argentina to the US State
Department. The document − analyzed in trial hearings − described in great
detail the plan that maximized the efforts of dictatorships in their crusade
against opponents and highlighted the "enthusiasm" of Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay. The cable also suggested that the murder of Orlando Letelier
in the embassy district of Washington, DC, likely formed part of the third
phase of Operation Condor.

There were other reports sent to the US government: CIA
cables and recounted conversations between Henry Kissinger and the Argentine Foreign
Affairs Minister, César Guzetti, and with the United States Ambassador to
Paraguay, Robert White. These documents revealed the logistics and resources
made available by the United States for the running of Operation Condor. For
example, some members of the criminal plan used a US base in the Panama Canal
that had a protected communications system, known as “Condortel,” and CIA

When US President Barack Obama visited Argentina in March,
he pledged to initiate a process to declassify Pentagon and CIA files dating
back to Argentina’s era of state terrorism. In addition to shedding more light
on the role of United States in Operation Condor, these documents may enable new
investigations to be opened.

In terms of justice and reparation, Argentina’s justice
process for the crimes against humanity committed during the last dictatorship
is unique in the region. As of December 2015, 154 convictions were handed down
and in-depth information came to light about the systematic plan to forcibly
disappear people, kidnappings, the appropriation of children and concealment of
their identities, operations by the security and armed forces, the complicity
of civilians in the repression, and the individuals responsible for those
crimes. The verdict in the Operation Condor trial and the new pathways that it
opens up have an unprecedented regional impact in terms of accountability
processes. News of the convictions was heard throughout the region and prompted
changes. In Bolivia, for example, the Association of Family Members of
Disappeared Detainees and Martyrs for the National Liberation of Bolivia
(Asofamd) and the son of the former Bolivian president killed by Operation
Condor, Juan José Torres, will make a formal request for the state to create a
long-postponed Truth Commission.

The human rights movement in Argentina was born out of
resistance to the extermination policy deployed by the military government.
Relatives of the victims and survivors from different groups and organizations
built a social movement that first fought against the dictatorial violence, and
then for its investigation and sanctioning to keep it from repeating ever again.
The recent guilty verdict for the criminal pact between the dictatorships of the
National Security Doctrine reminds us that the struggle for memory, truth and
justice is possible and necessary − and upholds the pillars of democratic

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